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Abstract: The paper considers univariate and multivariate models to forecast monthly 
conflict events in the Sudan over the out-of-sample period 2009 – 2012. The models used 
to generate these forecasts were based on a specification from a machine learning 
algorithm fit to 2000 – 2008 monthly data.  The idea here is that for policy purposes we 
need models that can forecast conflict events before they occur.  The model that includes 
previous month’s wheat price performs better than a similar model which does not include 
past wheat prices (the univariate model).  Both models did not perform well in forecasting 
conflict in a neighborhood of the 2012 “Heglig Crisis”. Such a result is generic, as “outlier 
or unusual events” are hard for models and policy experts to forecast.   
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On Forecasting Conflict in the Sudan: 2009 – 2012 
There is considerable evidence from around the world on a fundamental link between food 
insecurity and conflict.  Food prices in particular appear to be particularly important focus in 
much of the literature – a result consistent with historical assessments offered in non-technical 
literature on food prices and conflict.
2
   Hendrix and Brinkman (2013) review this evidence, much 
of which is observational, based on correlation or degree of “fit” between observations on conflict 
events and poverty (or some metric of food scarcity).  Our purpose in this note is to consider the 
forecasting merit of a particular fit relationship: wheat prices and conflict in the Sudan over post 
2000 data.  As noted by Clive Granger (1980, page 348), “it is generally accepted that to find a 
model that apparently fits better than another is much easier than to find one that forecasts better.”  
If “fit” relationships found in early periods do not carry-over to improved forecasting ability over 
later periods, the practical merits of the “fit” results are questionable. 
This paper is organized in three sections. In the next section we offer a brief review of 
literature on forecasting of conflict.  We follow with estimated (fit) models, both univariate and 
multivariate, of conflict, fatalities from conflict, and wheat prices on monthly observations from 
2001 through 2008.  These models are specified using a recently minted algorithm from the 
machine learning literature.  In terms of “fit” relationships we show that wheat prices in period t 
(wheat price(t)) are not influenced by either conflict or fatalities numbers, but are best modeled as 
a first order autoregressive process (wheat price (t-1)).  Conflict numbers in period t (conflict(t)) 
are modeled as first order autoregressions on themselves (conflict (t-1)) and wheat prices (t-1)). 
Finally, fatalities from conflict are modeled as a function of current conflict numbers (conflict(t)) 
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 See Carlyle (1849) and Lynn (2014) on bread prices and the French revolution and the Economist (2012) on food prices 
and the Arab Spring.   
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and two lag of fatalities from conflict (fatalities (t-1) and (t-2)). These “fit” results are generally in 
line with results reported in Chen, et al. (2014).  Based on the models “fit” with 2001 – 2008 data 
we explore out-of-sample forecast performance of both univariate and multivariate forecasts of 
wheat price, conflict and fatalities from conflict over 2009 – 2012 monthly data.  Both point 
(mean) forecasts and probability forecasts are studied.   
This paper makes a substantive contribution in two areas: it is the first paper on 
probabilistic forecasts of conflict in the Sudan.  By investigating the overall “goodness” of such 
forecasts we are able to assess the likelihood that certain periods of high or low conflict numbers 
were attributable to grain (in particular wheat) prices. Second, our paper demonstrates where 
improvement in knowledge and understanding of the causes of conflict are needed. While we do 
offer evidence that wheat prices are a mover of conflict numbers, we demonstrate, as well, time 
periods where wheat prices are clearly not the cause of conflict events.   
What emerges from this paper is the need to develop models capable of offering credible 
forecasts of extreme events.  In our case both models under consideration do a poor job of 
forecasting conflict numbers associated with the June 2012 “Heglig Crisis”.  While we are able to 
offer convincing evidence that the large jump in conflict numbers from May to June 2012 is not 
due to wheat price innovations or due to business as usual, we are not able to offer a model 
capable of offering credible “prevision” on its occurrence.  While over our entire “out-of-sample” 
forecasting period our probabilities do pass a statistical test of credibility, they suffer from a form 
of over-confidence at particular critical periods. Our discussion offers a suggestion for 
overcoming this weakness (in our models) and perhaps weaknesses of others operating at the 
interface of conflict, data analysis, and human behavior. 
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Literature 
The literature on forecasting conflict is relatively recent.  We do not provide a thorough review 
here but rely on that offered in Brandt, Freeman and Schrodt (2011).  They offer a set of five 
attributes that “should” characterize an ideal conflict forecasting model (tool): 
1. Such a model should produce accurate forecasts; 
2. It ought to produce near real-time forecasts; 
3. The ideal model ought to model full dynamics (with feedback among belligerents); 
4.  Expert knowledge should be easily incorporated; 
5. The model should be capable of making contingent (hypothetical “what if”) forecasts. 
Brandt, Freeman and Schrodt (2011) review several recent forays into the area. Three threads 
characterizing these models are: expected utility-game theoretic models; logistic regression; and 
Bayesian Vector Autoregressions. The expected utility-game theoretic models (Feder (1995) and 
Bueno de Mesquita (2010)), postulate preferences between belligerents and can solve for conflict 
probabilities. And, while they do allow for experts to help specify preferences and other model 
parameters, they do not produce real time forecasts.   A second thread follows the “State Failure 
Project” and work done at the CIA. Papers by King and Zeng (2001) and Goldstone, et al. (2010) 
use logistic regression on highly aggregated data.  While such models can also produce a 
probability of conflict, the aggregation level of data used makes real world application somewhat 
questionable (although it’s not exactly clear what the CIA uses in its real time efforts).  A third 
strand of literature reviewed by Brandt, Freeman and Schrodt (2011) is the structural Bayesian 
Vector Autoregression work described in Brandt and Freeman (2006) and extended in Brandt, 
Freeman and Schrodt (2011).  This work models the dynamic evolution of conflict relevant 
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variables as a vector autoregression. Probabilistic forecasts are offered and evaluated.  Expert 
opinion can be incorporated through an initial prior. If the data are measured with high frequency, 
and available in a timely manner, this model can produce near real time forecasts.  Further, if 
experts (human or artificial) can provide contemporaneous structure among innovations, reliable 
conditional (what if type analysis) probability forecasts are capable of generation.  
Meeting Brandt, Freeman, and Schrodt’s (2011) first attribute listed above begs the 
question: “accurate compared to what?”  In another forecasting setting Casillas-Olvera and Bessler 
(2006) accuracy was measured in terms of performance of the Bank of England’s forecasters 
relative to a set of “other forecasters”, who regularly issued subjective (expert opinion) forecasts 
on inflation rates and GDP growth.  Here we are not aware of a set of alternative forecasters to 
serve as a benchmark from which to judge the forecasts forthcoming from our data-based models.  
Accordingly, below we compare our point (mean) and probability forecasts from a multivariate 
model of conflict (conditioning on past wheat prices) against a model that does not condition on 
previous wheat prices.   
Chen, et al. (2014) provide “fit” evidence that grain prices in the Sudan Granger-cause 
conflict numbers in the Sudan based on monthly data.  Using a model similar in its dynamic 
structure as that of Brandt, Freeman and Schrodt (2011), Chen et al. (2014) show that wheat and 
grain sorghum prices explain a considerable proportion of the (within sample) forecast error 
variance of conflict numbers in the Sudan using monthly data observed over 2001 – 2012.   
In undivided Sudan wheat was primarily consumed in the Northern part (Abdelrahman, 
Ali Hasab 1998) especially by the urban dwellers. Following the trend of other East African 
countries wheat has become the staple food of non-subsistence households in Sudan during the 
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last decade (Mkumbwa 2011, Mostafa et al., 2013). Rapid urbanization in Sudan shifted 
consumer preference from sorghum to processed bread made from wheat. Although the 
production of wheat has increased marginally Mostafa et al., (2013) report that the average 
consumption of wheat has increased to 1770 thousand tons in the 2000’s from 743 thousand tons 
in the 1980s. The lack production of wheat in Sudan implies larger imports, higher price volatility 
and government intervention.           
Data and Models    
The data used in the current paper are monthly wheat prices, conflict numbers and fatalities from 
conflict numbers from the Sudan for the period 2001 – 2012. The nominal price data per ton of 
wheat reflect the monthly wholesale prices in Khartoum port. The source of the dataset is Global 
Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) Food Price Data and Analysis Tool, a real time 
data steaming source of Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. While 
Chen et al. (2014) use data on both North and South Sudan after the 2010 separation of the two 
countries; we use only data on North Sudan, as Chen et al. (2014) find a break point in the 
combined data from both countries in 2011, in a neighborhood of the division of the countries.  
Plots are given in figure 1.  
The data for the number of conflict events are obtained from Armed Conflict Location & 
Event Dataset (ACLED) (Raleigh, Linke, Hegre, and Carlsen 2010) over the same period. The 
ACLED dataset provides time specific information on recorded and reported battles, killings, riots, 
and recruitment activities of rebels, governments, militias, armed groups, protesters and civilians. 
And finally, Chen et al. (2014) use the procedure presented in Hsiao (1979) to specify a subset 
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vector autoregression; we follow the causal search literature, using PC algorithm (Spirtes, 
Glymour and Scheines (2000)) for model specification. 
The graphical pattern among current and lagged wheat prices, conflict numbers and fatalities 
from conflict numbers found with PC algorithm
3
 is given in Figure 2.  Notice first that there are 
several contemporaneous relations identified in the figure.  Wheat price (T-2) causes Conflict 
numbers (T-2).  Fatalities (T-2), (T-1), and (T) and Conflict (T-2), (T-1), and (T) have 
contemporaneous relationships (the bi-directed arrow between conflict and fatalities indicate the 
presence of a latent variable that may move both conflict and fatalities in contemporaneous time).   
As these contemporaneous relationships cannot be exploited for forecasting purposes, we do not 
explore them further here. In terms of lagged (time delayed) relationships we see wheat prices (W) 
are generated as a first order (univariate) autoregression.  Conflict (C) numbers are generated by 
one lag of Wheat prices (W (T-1)) and one lag of Conflict (C (T-1)) numbers.  Fatalities from 
conflicts (F(T)) are generated by two lag of Fatalities (F(T-1), F(T-2)).  The models fit
4
 over 2001 
– 2008 monthly data are given as equations (1), (2) and (3) below. 
 
(1)  W(T)  =   6.31  +  .92  W(T-1);    R2 = .83;  Qdf=23 = 30.4,  P-value = .14 
         (3.58)    (.06)   
 
                                                          
3
 PC Algorithm is a machine learning algorithm for finding causal structure (specifying exogenous or endogenous status) 
among a set of causally sufficient variables.  The latter suggested by prior theory and the problem under study. Key to PC’s 
ability to assign causal direction is the finding of unshielded colliders (inverted forks, say A B C).  Such colliders are 
uniquely identified if the ρ(A, C)=0; while ρ(A, B) and ρ(B, C) ≠ 0. Here ρ(i,j) represents the correlation between variables 
i and j, for i , j = A, B and C; see Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (2000) or Pearl (2009) for details.  
4
 Models fit are with the heteroskedastic consistent “robust errors” command for ordinary least squares found in RATS 
(Doan 2008). Standard errors are given in parentheses below the parameter estimate. R
2 
 is the coefficient of determination 
and Q is the diagnostic Q-Statistic associated with the null hypothesis of white noise errors (we reject the hypothesis with 
23 degrees of freedom at the p-value indicated in each equation).  
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(2) C(T)    =  -5.65   +  .17 W(T-1)   +  .30 C(T-1);  R2 = .47; Qdf=23 = 18.5, P-value = .73 
         (2.40)     (.04)                  (.11) 
 
(3)  F(T)   =    94.13  +  .32 F(T-1)   +  .17 F(T-2) ;   R2 = .17; Qdf=23 = 16.8, P-value = .81 
          (38.13)   (.30)                (.08) 
Equation (1) indicates that wheat prices (W) are fit with a modestly high coefficient of 
determination (.83), with no serious residual autocorrelation (as indicated by our failure to reject 
the null hypothesis of white noise residuals at usual (.10 or .05) p-values).  The degree of fit on 
the conflict equation (2) is much weaker (R
2
 = .47) than that for wheat price.  Interestingly wheat 
prices lagged one period show a larger simple t-statistic (t= .17/.04) than that associated with the 
estimated coefficient on conflict lagged one period in the second equation (t=.30/.11).  No strong 
evidence of autocorrelation amongst residuals is seen in equation number 2, as well.  Finally, 
equation (3) has even poorer fit (than equation (2)) as R
2 
is just .17.  It is the second lag of 
fatalities which shows the largest t-ratio (t=.17/.08) in this third equation.  Again, no evidence of 
autocorrelation in residuals is noted (p-value on Q is .81).      
Point Forecasts 
Recursive forecasts of wheat price, conflict numbers and fatalities from conflict are generated 
from these equations (as recursively re-estimated) for the monthly data 2009 – 2012.  Forecasting 
“goodness” results for point forecasts (mean of the under-lying probability distribution at each 
date) for one step, two-steps and twelve-step ahead horizons are given in table 1. These numbers 
are provided for both the Vector Autoregression (VAR) model summarized as equation (1), (2) 
and (3), as well as for the univariate forecasts (UNIV). As equation (1) and (3) are univariate, this 
comparison model is only different for equation (2), where lagged values of wheat price in the 
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conflict equation are dropped.  Accordingly, the results reported in Table 1 under the row labels 
Vector Autoregression and Univariate are the same for wheat price and fatalities. The entries 
differ on conflict entries.  
In terms of Mean Squared Error (MSE) measures we see the usual relationship between 
forecast performance and horizon (steps ahead). As we look further out for all three variables our 
forecast performance diminishes (as measured by higher MSE values).  Note as well that MSE 
measures for conflict forecasts associated with the Vector Autoregression are lower than 
corresponding measures associated with the univariate model at all horizons (steps ahead). This 
latter result is consistent with Granger’s notion of causality (Granger 1980): Wheat Price causes 
Conflict numbers. As a footnote to table 1, we report mean absolute percentage error at the one-
step-ahead horizon. These metrics indicate that wheat prices are much easier to forecast (MAPE 
= .07), relative to conflict numbers (MAPE=.92) and fatalities (MAPE=13.57) – a result 
consistent with the relative magnitudes of the R-squareds reported on each equation (1), (2) and 
(3) above. 
While the root mean squared error metrics presented in table 1 indicate that forecasts of 
conflict numbers based on models that include past wheat prices in the model are “better” than 
forecasts of conflict numbers that do not include past wheat prices (MSE’s are lower for the 
former at all horizons), there may not be a significant difference between the measures compared.  
In table 2 we present forecast encompassing results of the hypothesis that forecasts from the 
vector autoregression encompass forecasts from the univariate model and vice versa. 
Encompassing tests address the question:  can we dispense with the encompassed model and 
focus decision-making on the encompassing model? We offer results at all three horizons: do 
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forecasts from the VAR encompass forecasts from univariate model? Do forecasts from the 
univariate model encompass forecasts from the VAR model?   Each row of table 2 offers a test of 
the encompassing hypothesis (see the footnote to the table for the specification of the test).  We 
see that it is only at one-step ahead that we do not reject the encompassing hypothesis: forecasts 
from the VAR encompass forecasts from the univariate model at one-step ahead. At all other 
horizons the forecasts of each model do not encompass those of the other.  This provides evidence 
that the “wheat price causes conflict numbers” is a short-run phenomena (consistent with results 
reported in Chen et al. (2014) and in the graphical search results in figure 2). 
Continuing with the study of the relative merits of the two models (VAR and Univariate) 
for forecasting conflict numbers we look at the d-separation (conditional independence) relation 
among forecasts from the univariate model, the VAR model and the actual realization.  We do 
this for just the one-step horizon (given the outcomes of the encompassing test just reported).   
The d-separation
5
 results look for “blockage of information flow” amongst variables.  Figure 3 
shows that forecasts of conflict numbers emanating from the univariate model are “blocked” in 
their path to the actual realization of conflict numbers by forecasts from the VAR model – 
suggesting that one need not condition his/her decision-making with respect to conflict numbers 
on the univariate model.  The VAR forecasts capture all the relevant information (that’s available 
from these two forecasting models) about next month’s actual conflict numbers.    
  
                                                          
5
 D-separation (directional separation) is due to Judea Pearl (2000 page 16 ) and is key to sorting-out what needs to be 
conditioned on and what need not be conditioned on in decision-making environments.  Bessler and Wang (2011) explore 
it use in forecast evaluation for agricultural prices and US GDP and inflation rates. 
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Probability Forecasts 
Of course, no point forecast can capture the extent of uncertainty of a future realization, whether 
such a forecast comes from a large-scale (many equations) model, a simple autoregression or 
from a human expert. Below we offer comment on probability forecasts from the univariate 
autoregression and the vector autoregression, whose point forecasts were studied above.  
The literature on probability forecasts from models begins with Dawid (1984), although an 
earlier and certainly helpful literature on probability forecasting in psychology pre-dates Dawid’s 
efforts by several years.
6
  Here we follow Kling and Bessler (1989) and bootstrap forecasts 
emanating from equations (1), (2), and (3) and the univariate form on equation (2).  Uncertainty in 
errors on each equation and parameter uncertainty of each estimated parameter is accommodated 
by drawing on observed (historical) error terms in 1000 simulations at each out-of-sample data 
point.  This gives us 1000 forecasts of each variable, wheat price, conflict numbers and fatalities, 
at each date, January 2009 through December 2012. Again, as in our point forecasting results, the 
model parameters are up-dated sequentially, by re-estimating at every month, as it moves through 
the out-of-sample data, January 2009 through December 2012. 
Lichtenstein, et al. (1982) suggests calibration as an indicator of “goodness” of probability 
forecasts.  So for example, if our model (or our mind) issues a probability of p=.25 100 times we 
should expect, after the fact, that 25 of these 100 outcomes should be realized (be “true”).  Dawid 
(1984) builds on this calibration idea and the probability integral transform to offer a test of 
calibration through the associated cumulative density function (CDF).  That is to say, if our issued 
probability are placed into their CDF form (∫  ( )  
 
  
 ), where P(x)  is the probability 
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 See, for example, Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips (1982, page 306-334).  
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distribution
7
 on conflict being x, generated from the 1000 draws simulation described above, then 
the realized fractile (fractile on event that actually occurs, after the fact), will be uniformly 
distributed if the issued distribution is well-calibrated. A chi-squared test of well-calibration is 
offered in Dawid; its application to our conflict study is presented below.  
Calibration plots on conflict forecasts are presented in figure 4. A calibration plot on well-
calibrated forecasts would show the realized fractiles fall on a 45 degree line, in a plot of realized 
fractile against the relative frequency (Bunn 1982).  Forecasts from both the univariate and VAR 
models of conflict have realized fractiles not on the 45 degree line, but generally above it. 
Visually, the univariate plots are somewhat closer to the line, relative to the VAR plots. A formal 
test of well-calibration on both sets of forecasts is given in table 3. Here we do not reject the null 
hypothesis of well-calibration for both the univariate and the VAR forecasts of conflict at a 5% 
level of significance.  Similarly we do not reject the null of well-calibration on the forecasts on 
wheat price and fatalities from conflict (table 3).   
Given the decision reached in table 2, that our forecasts pass a Chi-squared test of well-
calibration, we investigate the issued probabilities on conflict for particularly interesting data 
realizations. First, we note that June 2009 was a particularly good month in that no conflicts 
occurred in the data set. The previous months of April and May saw 6 and 7 conflict numbers 
reported.  The issued probabilities for June 2009 are given in histogram form in figure 5. Both the 
VAR and the Univariate model issue probabilities that contain the actual realization in their 
modal class (0 CJune 2009 < 10); where CJune 2009 is the conflict number in June of 2009.
8
 The VAR 
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 Actually we use summation operations (not integrals)  as our work, below, involves discrete probabilities, not continuous. 
8
 Defining classes or bins for aggregating probabilities is somewhat arbitrary.  There is an extensive literature that attempts 
to decide on the number of probability bins from historical data (see, for example, Scott (1979) and Wand (1997)).  Here 
we argue that the proper number and size of each bin (the size does not have to be the same across all bins) is “best” 
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gave slightly preferred density forecasts, in the sense that its issued probability for this bin-class 
was .595; the univariate model issued its probability on this class as .588. 
A case where both models show less or no forecasting quality is found for the date June 
2012. This date corresponds to the largest number of conflict numbers in our data set (153 
conflicts).  Figure 6 shows the probability histograms for both models are centered on bin 3 = 
P(20CT< 30), with neither model issuing non-zero probabilities for the realized event (conflict for June 
2012 =153).  This date corresponds to the “Heglig Crisis”- an oil related set of conflict events 
between Sudan and South Sudan.  There is no hint of this extreme number in our data.  Conflict 
numbers for the preceding two months (May and April) are reported as 38 and 19, respectively.   
Further wheat price was within its recent historical range at 170 for May 2012 and 165 for April 
2012, both down from the high of $181/ton for December 2011. Clearly both models did not offer 
credible forecasts of conflict for June 2012. 
Another date which may be of interest is December 2011.  This date corresponds to the 
highest wheat price observation in our post-fit, forecasting, period of study.  Here wheat price (as 
indicated above) was $181/ton.  Figure 7 shows the associated histograms on conflict numbers for 
this month. Recall the VAR model has wheat price in its information set; while the univariate 
model does not.  The actual number of conflicts for December 2011 was 25. Conflict numbers for 
the preceding two months were 12 and 11, respectively. Both models issue their modal class as 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
defined by subject matter experts (most likely in the field) who must deal with consequences from conflict events.  If we 
follow the statistics literature (and there is not universal agreement on selection of bin width) we find bins in the 
neighborhood of 25 conflict numbers (using the result derive in Wand (1997), h = 3.49 ()/N1/3, where h is bin width,  is 
the standard deviation of the data (prior to our forecasting interval) and N refers to the number of observations prior to our 
forecasting interval.  Our subjective judgment is that bin width should be a bit narrower at low levels of conflict and 
perhaps higher at higher levels of conflict.  Needless to say this is an area for further research.   We use the outcome bins in 
Figures 5, 6 and 7  defined as follows: bin 1=P(0CT< 10); bin 2= P(10CT< 20); bin 3 = P(20CT< 30); bin 4 = P(30CT< 
40); bin 5 = P(40CT< 80); and bin 6 = P(80CT< ); where CT  is conflict at time T. 
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bin 2= P(10CDecember 2011< 20); however the VAR model places more density in this bin class 
relative to the univariate model (.141>.096). The latter places more density in bin 1 and less in bin 
3 (the realized bin) relative to the VAR model. 
Discussion 
Here we have explored the ability of two models in forecasting conflict numbers in the Sudan.  
An earlier paper found a “fit” relation between wheat prices and conflict numbers in the Sudan.  
We use similar data and explore the out-of-sample forecasting ability of similar models over 2009 
– 2012 monthly data on wheat prices, conflict numbers and fatalities in North Sudan. Both point 
(mean) and probability forecasts are studied from two candidate models: a univariate model, 
which expresses conflict numbers at time t as a function of conflict numbers at time t-1 and a 
vector autoregression model which expresses conflict numbers a time t as dependent on conflict 
numbers in t-1 and wheat prices in time t-1.  Point forecasting results indicate the VAR model 
preforms better in terms of root mean squared forecast errors and forecast encompassing.  Both 
models offer well-calibrated probability forecasts over our post fit period. Clearly, knowledge of 
wheat prices in month t is helpful in forecasting conflict numbers for month t+1; a result that 
coheres well with ‘fit” results found on earlier data via a machine learning algorithm.   
While we do not reject well-calibration for both models’ probability forecasts, both do not 
perform well in their forecasts conflict for June 2012.  This month corresponds to the “Heglig 
Crisis”- an oil related set of conflict events between North and South Sudan.  There is no 
information in either the history of conflict numbers or wheat prices to hint of the large number of 
conflicts that occurred at this date. Both models issue probability forecasts of zero on conflict 
events in a neighborhood of the number actually observed. This exposes clearly the need to rely 
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on more than formal models on historically relevant data in forecasting conflict (or in terms of 
forecasting human subject outcomes, in general). In our literature review we cite the need to bring 
experts into the forecasting exercise, as suggested by Brandt, Freeman, and Schrodt (2011).  
Some information variables are measured and reported regularly – market prices are one 
such variable.  And, as food is of particular importance for human existence, its price can offer us 
prevision of up-coming conflict.  Other information is not reported regularly, as it occurs in a 
seemingly unsystematic pattern. The “Heglig Crisis” which erupted in extreme conflict in June of 
2012 was clearly not a wheat price caused event. Most discussions cite oil as the root cause (see 
the UN report cited below). Here  subjective judgment may well have improved our model’s 
forecasts.  In May 2012 the “Security Council Report” from the United Nations discusses this 
crisis. This discussion indicates clearly the existence of evidence that a rise in conflict was 
eminent.  The following quote of the UN report  supports that such evidence was communicated 
to both parties of the potential (and finally realized) conflict: “A key issue is whether and how the 
Council can exert sufficient leverage on the parties to deter them from expanding their conflict, 
induce them to cease fighting, and convince them to return in good faith to the negotiating table. 
Since February, the Council has produced two press statements and two presidential statements 
regarding the situation in Sudan and South Sudan with what appears to be minimal impact on the 
calculations of the parties.”   
Even if we can forecast increases in conflict, can we find some way to prevent or mitigate 
the possibility of such events coming to pass?  Such efforts at mitigation would, in turn, require 
more elaborate forecasting models, as we would now have to offer our forecasts on the 
16 
 
probability of conflict, given a particular mitigation strategy has been undertaken. Much of such 
conditioning information will likely be subjective, varying from episode to episode. 
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Figure 1. Time Series Plots of Wheat Price, Conflict Numbers, and Fatalities from Conflict in 
Sudan, 2001 – 2012, monthly data.  
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                            Figure 2. Graphical Pattern Found with PC Algorithm.
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 Variable symbols are as follows: Wheat Price in period T is represented as W(T), Conflict in period T as C(T) and 
Fatalities from Conflict in period T as F(T). Lags of each of the above are indicated using T-1 and T-2 for one and two lags, 
respectively. Data used to fit the graph given here are monthly on Wheat Prices, Conflict Numbers and Fatalities from 
Conflict in the Sudan 2001 – 2008. The p-value used in the PC Algorithm search was 10%. Details on the Algorithm are 
given in Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (2000). 
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Figure 3. Graphical Pattern on Forecasts of Conflict and Actual Conflict Numbers in the 
Sudan from Monthly data 2009 – 2012.10 
 
  
                                                          
10
 The forecasting models were univariate and multivariate (VAR) models found in figure 2.  Conflict has one lag of itself 
as its univariate representation.  Conflict has one lag of itself and one lag of wheat price as its multivariate (VAR) 
representation. The p-value used in the PC Algorithm search was 10%. 
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Figure 4. Realized Fractiles and Relative Frequencies on Conflict Events from the 
Univariate Model and VAR Model Probability Forecasts: Sudan, January 2009 – 
December 2012. 
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Figure 5. Probabilities Issued on Conflict Numbers from Univariate and VAR Model for 
June 2009.
11  
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 The probability bins in Figure 5 are defined as follows: bin 1=P(0CJune 2009< 10); bin 2= P(10CJune 2009< 20); bin 3 = 
P(20CJune 2009< 30); bin 4 = P(30CJune 2009< 40); bin 5 = P(40CJune 2009< 80); and bin 6 = P(80CJune 2009< ). 
 
Actual Number of Conflicts 
June 2009 = 0 
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 Figure 6. Probabilities Issued on Conflict Numbers from Univariate and VAR Model for 
June 2012.
12
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 The probability bins in Figure 6 are defined as follows: bin 1=P(0CJune 2012< 10); bin 2= P(10CJune 2012< 20); bin 3 = 
P(20CJune 2012< 30); bin 4 = P(30CJune 2012< 40); bin 5 = P(40CJune 2012< 80); and bin 6 = P(80CJune 2012< ). 
Actual Number of Conflicts 
June 2012 = 153 
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 Figure 7. Probabilities Issued on Conflict Numbers from Univariate and VAR      
Model for December 2011.
1
                                                          
1
 The probability bins in Figure 7 are defined as follows: bin 1=P(0CDecember 2011< 10); bin 2= P(10CDecember2011< 
20); bin 3 = P(20CDecember 2011< 30); bin 4 = P(30CDecember 2011< 40); bin 5 = P(40CDecember 2011< 80); and bin 6 = 
P(80CDecember 2011< ).  
Actual Number of Conflicts  
December 2011 = 25 
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Table 1. Forecast Error Metrics on one-step-ahead forecasts of Wheat Prices, Conflict, and 
Fatalities from Conflict in the Sudan 2009 – 2012, Monthly Data. 
 
Series/Model/Steps 
Ahead 
RMSE
1
 Theil U
2 
Number of 
Forecasts 
Wheat    
Univariate    
1-step 11.89 1.03 48 
2-steps 16.73 1.07 47 
12-steps 45.80 1.49 37 
    
VAR    
1-step 11.89 1.03 48 
2-steps 16.73 1.07 47 
12-steps 45.80 1.49 37 
    
Conflict    
Univariate    
1-step 23.39 1.05 48 
2-steps 29.51 1.08 47 
12-steps 39.69 1.05 37 
    
VAR    
1-step 21.55 .97 48 
2-steps 25.81 .95 47 
12-steps 35.92 .95 37 
    
Fatalities    
Univariate    
1-step 176.82 .80 48 
2-steps 179.30 .76 47 
12-steps 185.30 .74 37 
    
VAR    
1-step 176.82 .80 48 
2-steps 179.30 .76 47 
12-steps 185.30 .74 37 
 
                                                          
1
 Root Mean squared error (RMSE) is calculated as: RMSE =( ∑ ( ( )   ( ))   
2
/K)
.5
 , where A(t) is the actual value, 
F(t) is the forecasted value from either the univariate or VAR model, K is the number of out of sample forecasts 
studied. 
2
 Theil U compares the mean squared error from the model (univariate or VAR) with that emanating from a random 
walk forecast (last period actual is the forecast of next period’s actual).  Theil U < 1.0 are preferred to Theil U’s 
>1.0.  Mean Absolute Per Cent Error (MAPE) are given at one step ahead as: .07 (wheat price), .92 (conflict 
numbers and 13.57 (fatalities). Numbers at higher levels are increasing and reflect the ordering: 
 MAPEwheat < MAPEconflict < MAPEfatalities.   
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Table 2. Encompassing Tests on One-, Two-,  and Three-Steps Ahead Forecasts of Conflict
1
 
 
Step Ahead Null Hypothesis ˆ  p-value Decision 
1 VAR Encompasses UNIV -.64 .11 Fail to 
Reject 
1 UNIV Encompasses VAR 1.64 .00 Reject 
     
2 VAR Encompasses UNIV -.80 .02 Reject 
2 UNIV Encompasses VAR 1.80 .00 Reject 
     
12 VAR Encompasses UNIV -4.49 .00 Reject 
12 UNIV Encompasses VAR 5.49 .00 Reject 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1
 The entries in the table refer to estimated value of lambda ( ˆ ) from an ordinary least squares regression:  
                                                        e1t = λ(e1t – e2t ) + εt ,  
where e1t  refers to forecast errors from the encompassing model, e2t  refers to forecast errors from the encompassed 
model, both for out-of-sample data for period t and εt is a white noise disturbance from the encompassing regression.  
Following Harvey and Newbold (2000) all regression models are estimated with White’s “robusterrors” procedure 
to account for possible heteroskedasticity in errors.   We reject the null hypothesis (stated in the second column from 
the left for low p-values; i.e. values lower than .05.  All estimation was carried-out using RATS (Doan 2009). 
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Table 3. Chi-Squared Statistics on Calibration of Probability Forecasts of Wheat Prices, Conflict and 
Fatalities from Conflict in the Sudan 2009 – 2012, Monthly Data. 
 
Series/Model Calculated
1
   
χ2 
Critical 
χ(.05,df=9)
2
 
Decision with Respect to the 
Null Hypothesis 
Wheat    
Univariate
2
 11.58 16.9 Fail to Reject 
VAR
3
 11.58 16.9 Fail to Reject 
    
Conflict    
Univariate
2 
12.83 16.9 Fail to Reject 
Vector Autoregression
3 
14.91 16.9 Fail to Reject 
    
Fatalities    
Univariate
2 
8.3 16.9 Fail to Reject 
Vector Autoregression
3 
8.3 16.9 Fail to Reject 
1. The null hypothesis in every case in the table is that the issued probabilities are well-calibrated. The χ2 statistics are 
calculated as follows:  χ2  =∑ (      )
      
  
   
; where mi are the number of realized fractiles in category i, 
where categories are defined as c1 = (0,.099), c2 =(.100, .199), …,  c10 = (.900, .999).  
2. The univariate forecast are generated from the fit model  Yt = βo  +   β1 Yt-1  +…+  βk Yt-k  + t ; where Yt  is a scalar 
holding either observations at time t on conflict or fatalities, βo , β1 , … βk are scalars, recursively up-dated at each 
data point;  1000 draws on the sampling distributions on βo,i , β1,i  ,…, βk,i  and t+1 are used to form 1000 forecasts, 
Ŷt+1,i = βo,i  +  β1,i Yt  +…+  βk,i Yt-k+1  + t+1,i ;  i = 1, …, 1000.   
3. The vector autoregressive  forecasts are generated as:  Yt = βo  +  β1Yt-1  +…+  βk Yt-k  +  t+1 ; where :  Yt  is a  
vector holding wheat price, sorghum price, conflict and fatalities at time t,  βo  is a vector of constants, one for each 
series, and  β1 , …, βk are matrices holding estimated coefficients, relating Yt  to lags Yt-1,… , Yt-k.  The estimated 
betas are recursively up-dated at each data point;  1000 draws on the sampling distributions on βo,i , β1,i  ,…, βk,i  and 
t+1 are used to form 1000 forecasts, Ŷt+1,i = βo,i  +  β1,i Yt  +…+  βk,i Yt-k+1  + t+1,i ;  i = 1, …, 1000. 
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